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Mackey v. Montrym: Clarification
on a Matter of Timing
The United States Supreme Court, in Mackey v. Montrum, held that Massa-
chusetts "implied consent" statute, which allowed summary suspension of
driver's licenses, was constitutional in the face of a procedural due process
challenge. In so doing, the Court reversed the district court case of Mon-
trym v. Panora ruling that the statute was unconstitutional and distin-
guishable from the holding in the case of Dixon v. Love. The Court in Love
had upheld the constitutionality of driver's license summary suspension
procedures. The Mackey Court held that the distinguishing factors em-
ployed by the district court were not constitutionally determinative. The
author undertakes a study of the history of procedural due process and the
timing of hearings and focuses on the procedural aspects as they apply to
summary driver's license revocation or suspension laws. In summary, the
author indicates that the Court's judicial "housekeeping" will result in
more consistent rulings on the constitutionality of summary driver's li-
cense revocation or suspension schemes while also facilitating a more con-
sistent method of procedural due process analysis.
I. INTRODUCTION
In Mackey v. Montrym' the United States Supreme Court re-
viewed on appeal the ruling of the case of Montrym v. Panora2
made by the United States District Court for the District of Mas-
sachusetts. The Panora case held that a summary suspension of
one's driver's license under an automobile "implied consent" stat-
ute3 violated the due process clause of the fourteenth amend-
ment.
II. FACTS OF THE CASE
Donald Montrym was involved in an automobile collision at 8:15
p.m. on May 15, 1976 in Acton, Massachusetts. The police officer
1. 99 S. Ct. 2612 (1979).
2. 438 F. Supp. 1157 (D. Mass. 1977). This was a second opinion denying re-
consideration of an earlier case bearing the names of the same parties. Aside from
the facts of the case, as discussed in text accompanying notes 4-21 infra, all refer-
ences to Montrym v. Panora shall hereinafter apply to this second opinion.
3. In general, these laws provide that anyone possessing a driver's license
and operating a vehicle on the state highways has given tacit consent to be tested
for blood-alcohol content should he or she ever be arrested for drunk driving. Dis-
cussion of the "implied consent" statute in this article does not refer to implied
consent laws which establish the basis for state "long-arm" jurisdiction for service
of process. See generally Hunvald & Zimring, Whatever Happened to Implied Con-
sent? A Sounding, 33 Mo. L. REv. 323, 324 (1968).
at the scene of the accident was of the opinion that Montrym was
drunk,4 and arrested him for driving under the influence of intoxi-
cating liquor.5 Once at the police station, Montrym refused a re-
quest to take a "breathalyzer" examination.6 Under the direction
of a Massachusetts statute, the officers immediately prepared a
report indicating that Montrym refused to take the test.7 Later,
upon the arrival of his attorney, Montrym requested to take the
test but was denied the opportunity to do so. The officer's report
was subsequently forwarded to the Registrar of Motor Vehicles
for certification. 8 The Registrar then, acting under statutory direc-
tion, summarily suspended Montrym's driver's license for 90
days.9 This suspension was made despite the fact that the state
court had acquitted Montrym of the drunk driving charges10
Montrym's attorney twice requested the Registrar to return the
4. 99 S. Ct. at 2614. The officer's report provided this description of Montrym:
"glassy eyes, unsteady on his feet, slurring his speech, and emitting a strong alco-
holic odor from his person."
5. Montrym was also charged with "driving to endanger" and driving without
a registration. Id.
6. A "breathalyzer" is a machine into which the arrested motorist exhales
and,
a known amount of aveolar breath is trapped in a cylinder. A piston then
forces the breath sample into a test ampoule containing a dichromate so-
lution. The oxidation of any alcohol in the solution causes a color change
in the test ampoule which is measured by comparing it to a standard am-
poule. A photovoltaic cell is mounted behind each ampoule and a light
bulb on a moveable rack is located between them. As the color of the test
ampoule fades, the light moves toward the standard ampoule. The
machine then measures the distance the light has moved and calibrates it
into a blood-alcohol percentage. This light must be balanced before the
test is begun in order to achieve accurate results.
Gottleib, The South Carolina Implied Consent Law: The "Breathalyzer and the
Bar," S. CAR. L. REV. 195, 198 (1970).
7. MAss. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 90, § 24(1) (f) (West Supp. 1976) provides in
part: "If the person arrested refuses to submit to a breathalyzer test ... the of-
ficer before whom such refusal was made shall immediately prepare a written re-
port of such refusal" (emphasis added).
8. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 90, § 24(1) (f) (West Supp. 1976) also required:
Such written report of refusal shall be endorsed by a third person who
shall have witnessed such refusal. Each such report shall be ... sworn to
under the penalties of perjury by the police officer before whom such re-
fusal was made. Each such report shall set forth the grounds for the of-
ficer's belief that the person arrested had been driving a motor vehicle...
while under the influence of intoxicating liquor and shall state that such
person had refused to submit to such chemical test ... when requested
by such police officer to do so. Each such report shall be endorsed by the
police chief . . . or by the person authorized by him and shall be sent
forthwith to the registrar.
9. Id. "Upon receipt of such report, the registrar shall suspend any license or
permit to operate motor vehicles . . . in the Commonwealth . . . for a period of
ninety days" (emphasis added). Note that the registrar has no discretionary au-
thority under this section of the statute.
10. 99 S. Ct. at 2615. The apparent basis for the acquittal on the drunk driving
charge was that the police failed to give Montrym the breathalyzer test when he
later requested it. Although not mentioned in the case, the lack of evidence [the
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license but both requests were denied.11 Thereafter, Montrym by-
passed 12 his immediate post-suspension hearing13 and adminis-
trative appeal and brought a class action suit before a three judge
district court, claiming that the Massachusetts implied consent
statute was unconstitutional "on its face" and "as applied" to this
case. Montrym's contention was that the summary procedure of
the statute violated procedural due process because there was no
hearing prior to the suspension. In this case of Montrym v. Pa-
nora,14 the district court relied on Bell v. Burson' 5 and con-
cluded 16 that Montrym was entitled to "some sort of
presuspension hearing."'1 Panora additionally held that the Mas-
sachusetts implied consent statute was unconstitutional "on its
face" as violative of the due process clause of the fourteenth
results of a breathalyzer test which are admissible as evidence under section
24(1) (e)] of drunk driving may have contributed to the state court acquittal.
11. 99 S. Ct. at 2615, 2616. Montrym's attorney, however, did not include the
state court order dismissing the drunk driving charges in the request. MASS. GEN.
LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24(2) (c) (West Supp. 1976) states that such an order would
statutorily permit the Registrar to return the license to the acquitted motorist.
The Court noted "had Montrym enclosed a copy of the order dismissing the drunk
driving charge, the entire matter might well have been disposed of." 99 S. Ct. at
2616.
12. A possible explanation for the failure to pursue the administrative remedy
is that "one may not retain the benefits of [an] Act while attacking the constitu-
tionality of one of its important provisions." Fahey v. Malone, 332 U.S. 245, 255
(1947). Cf., Mackey v. Montrym, 99 S. Ct. at 2626 (where the dissent suggests the
failure of the police or Registrar to notify Montrym of his administrative remedies
was the reason for the bypass).
13. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24(1) (q) (West Supp. 1976), provides:
Any person whose license, permit or right to operate has been suspended
under paragraph (f) shall be entitled to a hearing before the registrar
which shall be limited to the following issues: (1) did the police officer
have reasonable grounds to believe that such person had been operating a
motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor ... (2) was
such person placed under arrest, and (3) did such person refuse to submit
to such test or analysis. If, after such a hearing, the registrar finds on any
one of the said issues in the negative, the registrar shall reinstate the ...
license (emphasis added).
14. 429 F. Supp. 393 (D. Mass. 1977). See also note 2 supra.
15. 402 U.S. 535 (1971). In this case the Court ruled that a presuspension hear-
ing was necessary to determine the probability of judgment being rendered
against an uninsured motorist. Since the goal of the statute was to make sure
there was a source of funds from which a judgment could be satisfied, the determi-
nation of the hearing would indicate whether the necessary bond had to be posted
in order to avoid suspension. Id. at 542.
16. In a two to one opinion, 429 F. Supp. 393 (D. Mass. 1977).
17. Since the opinion was in memorandum form, the majority did not elabo-
rate on what type, or form, of hearing was necessary. Id. at 393.
amendment due to the lack of such presuspension hearing.1 8 The
court thus directed the Registrar to return Montrym's license.
The Registrar subsequently appealed to the district court for
stay and modification of its judgment but the request was denied.
After the United States Supreme Court handed down the decision
of Dixon v. Love, 19 where a procedure resulting in the summary
suspension of drivers' licenses was held constitutional on proce-
dural due process grounds, the Registrar moved for reconsidera-
tion of his previous appeal. In the second opinion of Montrym v.
Panora20 the district court distinguished the Love decision and
once again denied the appeal. Thereafter, the Registrar appealed
to the United States Supreme Court where the appeal was
granted upon probable jurisdiction.21
A. Issue Presented
Is a summary suspension 22 procedure constitutional under pro-
cedural due process grounds if there is a provision in the statu-
tory scheme that furnishes an immediate post suspension review
of the facts which warranted the suspension? The Mackey
Court23 answered this question in the affirmative.
B. Background
Having assumed the role of the ultimate interpreter of the Con-
stitution,24 the United States Supreme Court has frequently been
implored to test various executive, legislative, and administrative
acts against the fourteenth amendment due process clause. 25
However, the inexact nature of the term "due process" 26 and the
18. The District Court, having held the statute unconstitutional "on its face,"
thereafter precluded from appellate consideration, the merits of an "as applied"
constitutional attack on the Massachusetts law. See note 156 infra, and accompa-
nying text.
19. 431 U.S. 105 (1977).
20. 438 F. Supp. 1157 (D. Mass. 1977). See also note 2 supra.
21. Mackey v. Montrym, 435 U.S. 967 (1978).
22. The term "summary" hereinafter denotes no prior hearing.
23. The Mackey Court majority was comprised of five justices: Mr. Chief Jus-
tice Burger and Justices Powell, Blackmun, Rehnquist and White. The dissent
was comprised of four justices: Stewart, Brennan, Marshall and Stevens. The
Chief Justice wrote the opinion for the majority while Mr. Justice Stewart au-
thored the dissenting opinion.
24. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
25. The fourteenth amendment states in relevant part: "No State shall... de-
prive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law." U.S.
CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
26. "'Due process' is an elusive concept. Its exact boundaries are undefinable,
and its content varies according to specific factual contexts." Hannah v. Larche,
363 U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
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"interests" it was designed to protect,27 has often made the
Court's work more difficult.28 The methods of analysis utilized by
the Court when confronted with the constitutionally required "op-
portunity to be heard," or hearing,29 have been particularly sus-
pect in a procedural due process context.
In an effort to create a predictable and fair3O procedural due
process "formula" concerning hearings, the Court has followed
two paths. The earlier path involved an analysis of what consti-
tuted the appropriate form of a hearing.3 1 Since 1969, the second
path regarding when a hearing was mandated, or the question of
timing, became of prime importance to the Court.32 It was along
this second path of timing which the Court addressed the proce-
dural due process issues in Mackey.
27. Saphire, Specifying Due Process Values: Towards a More Responsive Ap-
proach to Procedural Protection, 127 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 112 (1978) [hereinafter
cited as Due Process Values].
28. "The amount of attention which the Court has given to the [procedural]
due process question has produced a wealth of conflicting viewpoints. . ." Simet,
The Right to a Predeprivation Hearing Under the Due Process Clause-Constitu-
tional Priorities and a Suggested Method for Making Decisions, 11 CREIGHTON L.
REV. 1201, 1202 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Predeprivation Hearing].
29. Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
30. Due Process Values, supra note 27, at 113. Subrin and Dykstra, Notice and
the Right to be Heard: The Significance of Old Friends, 9 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV.
453, 454 (1974) [hereinafter Notice and Right to be Heard].
31. The issue of form of a hearing, whether the hearing should be conducted
along the lines of a full scale trial or a mere informal conversation, is beyond the
scope of this article. For an excellent analysis of the formality aspects of a proce-
dural due process hearing see Friendly, Some Kind of Hearing, 123 U. PA. L. REV.
1267, 1270-71 (1975).
32. The Court's interest in the timing aspect of the due process hearing has
been evident since 1969, when it enunciated the prior hearing rule in Sniadach v.
Family Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337 (1969). Since then there has been a proliferation of
cases dealing with this issue. See, e.g. Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105 (1977); Montayne
v. Haymes, 427 U.S. 236 (1976); Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 251 (1976); Bishop v.
Wood, 426 U.S. 341 (1976); Paul v. Davis, 424 U.S. 693 (1976); Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319 (1976); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975); Calero-Toledo v. Pearson
Yacht Leasing Co., 416 U.S. 663 (1974); Mitchell v. W. T. Grant Co., 416 U.S. 600
(1974); Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U.S. 134 (1974); Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67
(1974); Weinberger v. Hymson, Westcott & Dunning, Inc., 412 U.S. 609 (1973); Ga-
gnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778 (1973); Perry v. Sinderman, 408 U.S. 593 (1972);
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564 (1972); Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972); Connell v. Higginbotham, 403 U.S. 207 (1971); Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535
(1971); Wisconsin v. Constantineau, 400 U.S. 433 (1971); Wheeler v. Montgomery,
397 U.S. 280 (1970); Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970). See also Predeprivation
Hearing, note 28 supra.
III. THE PRIOR HEARING RULE AND ITS EXCEPTION
The origin of the requirement that a hearing precede the depri-
vation of a constitutionally protected interest 33 in an administra-
tive law context can be found in Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust
Co.34 This case stated that a "meaningful opportunity to be
heard" was a fundamental requisite of due process of law. 35 The
required hearing, as articulated in Mullane, was subsequently
employed as the basis for the Supreme Court's ruling in Sniadach
v. Family Finance Corp., stating that a hearing must be given
prior to the deprivation of a person's constitutionally protected
interests. 36 However, the Court rejected an unqualified right to
prior hearing by stating in Sniadach, that a "summary procedure
may well meet the requirements of due process in extraordinary
[emergency] situations. .... ,37
In 1970 the Court confirmed the viability of the Sniadach prior
hearing rule and emergency exception in Goldberg v. Kelly.38
However, in Goldberg, Mr. Justice Brennan, in writing for the ma-
jority, enunciated an "approach" within the context of the prior
hearing rule for deciding the constitutionality of summary welfare
payment termination procedures by the state. This "approach"
involved a process of balancing the interests of the parties in a
case. Against the "justified desire to protect public funds must be
weighed the individual's overpowering need ... not to be wrong-
fully deprived of assistance." 39
The case of Bell v. Burson4O undoubtedly signalled the heyday
of the prior hearing rule. The "interest" involved in Bell, a
driver's license, was, in the eyes of the majority, not as important
to a person as were the wages or welfare payments respectively
at stake in Sniadach and Goldberg. Nonetheless, the Court
33. The first task of the Court's procedural due process analysis is to deter-
mine whether the interest being deprived falls under fourteenth amendment pro-
tection. Since "[pirocedural due process imposes constraints on governmental
decisions which deprive individuals of "liberty" or "property" interests within the
meaning of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth or Fourteenth Amendment," Ma-
thews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 331 (1976), a determination by the Court that the
interest is not constitutionally protected obviates the need for a procedural due
process discussion. For purposes of this article the property interest at stake is a
driver's license, the nature of which has been deemed to fall under the purview of
constitutional protection. Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. 535, 539 (1971). See also Cafete-
ria & Restaurant Workers Union v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961).
34. 339 U.S. 306 (1950).
35. Id. at 314.
36. 395 U.S. 337 (1969). This case held that a prejudgment wage garnishment
procedure violated procedural due process.
37. Id. at 339. See also Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 378-79 (1970).
38. 397 U.S. 254 (1970).
39. 397 U.S. at 261.
40. 402 U.S. 535 (1971). See note 15 supra.
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stated that unless there was an emergency at hand, due process
required a hearing prior to the deprivation of the driver's li-
cense.
41
The prior hearing rule was augmented by Boddie v. Connecti-
cut.42 The Boddie majority held that a statute, which required
payment of court fees and costs incident to divorce proceedings,
effectively foreclosed women who were on welfare from access to
a judicial hearing and was thus unconstitutional. The Boddie ma-
jority, while reiterating the role of a prior hearing as a fundamen-
tal aspect of due process, also stated that the balancing of the
interests of the parties pertained solely to questions of the form of
a hearing, not to questions of the timing of the hearing.43
The subsequent case of Fuentes v. Shevin44 extended the prior
hearing rule to relatively small property interests subject to sum-
mary replevin procedures. 45 Fuentes also confirmed Boddie stat-
41. "[I]t is fundamental that except in emergency situations due process re-
quires . . . 'notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the
case' before the termination becomes effective." 402 U.S. at 542. This is the em-
bodiment of the emergency (or "extraordinary situations," Boddie v. Connecticut,
401 U.S. 371, 379 (1970)) exception where a prior hearing would not be constitu-
tionally mandated. The latter case of Fuentes v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 90-91 (1972)
further elaborates the exception:
Only in a few limited situations has this Court allowed outright seizure
without opportunity for a prior hearing. First, in each case, the seizure
has been directly necessary to secure an important governmental or gen-
eral public interest. Second, there has been a special need for very
prompt action. Third, the State has kept strict control over its monopoly
of legitimate force: the person initiating the seizure has been a govern-
ment official responsible for determining, under the standards of a nar-
rowly drawn statute, that it was necessary and justified in the particular
instance.
Cases often cited as authority and illustration of the emergency exception are:
Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U.S. 594 (1950) (summary seizure of
misbranded food supplement); Fahey v. Malone, 332 U.S. 245, 255 (1947) (summary
procedure where conservation takes over savings and loan association manage-
ment); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414 (1944) (adoption of wartime price regu-
lations); Phillips v. Comm'r., 283 U.S. 589 (1931) (summary tax preserving creditors
rights); North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U.S. 306 (1908) (summary
seizure of food unfit for human consumption). See note 37 supra.
42. 401 U.S. 371 (1970).
43. The formality and procedural requisites for the hearing can vary, de-
pending upon the importance of the interests involved and the nature of
the subsequent proceedings. That the hearing required by due process is
subject to waiver and is not fixed in form does not affect its root require-
ment that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is
deprived of any significant property interest (emphasis added).
401 U.S. at 378, 379.
44. 407 U.S. 73 (1972).
45. The "property" interests at stake in Fuentes were a variety of household
ing that there would be no balancing of interests concerning
determination of the timing of a hearing.46
Thus, in 1971, the question of timing of hearings under procedu-
ral due process was clear. A hearing prior to the deprivation of a
constitutionally protected interest was required. Unless there
was an emergency present, variance from the prior hearing rule
would sound the death knell for a state summary procedure. It
was also clear from Boddie and Fuentes, that despite the
Goldberg statement to the contrary, the balancing of interests
would not be employed in assessing the constitutionality of a
given procedure's timing of a hearing.
IV. THE EROSION OF THE PRIOR HEARING RULE
The prior hearing rule suffered its initial setback in the case of
Mitchell v. W. T. Grant C0.47 where the Court upheld a summary
sequestration statute. 8 The Court distinguished Mitchell from
Fuentes on several grounds, notably on the presence of a neutral
magistrate.49 In Mitchell, the summary procedure was upheld on
grounds that were clearly not an emergency.50 More importantly,
the interests of the litigants were balanced in a determination of a
timing issue.5 1 Such a pronouncement was a clear departure from
the Sniadach prior hearing rule, the emergency exception, and
the Boddie and Fuentes refusal to balance interests in timing
questions. 52
The departure advanced in Mitchell was confirmed in Fusari v.
Steinberg5 3 where the Court noted that the interests of the par-
goods (a gas stove and a stereophonic phonograph) purchased under a conditional
sales contract.
46. 407 U.S. at 82, 90 n.21.
47. 416 U.S. 600 (1973).
48. "Sequestration" (under Louisiana civil law) is a device used to resolve dis-
puted title to property while at the same time to protect the property from deterio-
ration, waste, or conversion. 416 U.S. at 605.
49. The specific differences between the two cases were that in Mitchell a writ
was issued upon a verified petition and reviewed by a judge. In Fuentes a clerk
reviewed the petition and issued the replevin order. Also, the Mitchell procedure
provided that the person from whom the property was seized could have the writ
dissolved if the creditor failed to show payment default. Id. at 606.
50. Compare the property interests at stake in Mitchell; a refrigerator, stove,
and stereo, 416 U.S. at 601, with those interests associated with the emergency ex-
ception. See note 41 supra.
51. "Resolution of the due process question must take account not only of the
interests of the buyer of the property but those of the seller as well." 416 U.S. at
604.
52. See notes 36, 43, 46 supra, and accompanying text. See generally Notice
and Right to be Heard, supra note 30, at 470 n.107 (The author notes that a change
in the membership of the Court circa the determination of Mitchell might have
been the reason for the turnabout from the Fuentes decision).
53. 419 U.S. 379 (1974).
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ties, as well as the sufficiency of the hearing process, were subject
to balancing analysis.5 4 However, the subsequent case of Goss v.
Lopez55 explicitly rejected the balancing approach in timing
questions.5 6 Furthermore, Goss adhered to the prior hearing rule
and its emergency exception.5 7 Thus, the Goss decision evi-
denced a return to the rules of Sniadach, Boddie, and Fuentes.
After the Goss decision, criticism of the Court's inconsistent
handling of procedural due process issues ensued.58 The Court
seemingly advanced two lines of due process jurisprudence. The
first line adhered to the prior hearing rule and its emergency ex-
ception. The second line required that some type of hearing be
given, prior to or after the deprivation, that could lead to a rein-
statement of the interest.59 In 1976 the Supreme Court addressed
this anomaly, by expressly adopting a balancing approach and let-
ting the most important interest in the balance determine when a
prior hearing was necessary, in the case of Mathews v. Eldridge.60
V. THE ELDRIDGE BALANCE AND DRIVER'S LICENSES
Noted as a major "reformation" of prior case law,6 1 Mathews v.
Eldridge outlined the criteria for determining whether a prior
54. Id. at 389. However, in this case the record failed to disclose the operation
of the review process. Without such information the Court could not employ its
balancing approach.
55. 419 U.S. 565 (1975).
56. "It also appears from our cases that the timing and content of notice and
the nature IformI of the hearing will depend on the appropriate accommodation of
the competing interests involved" (emphasis added). Id. at 579.
57. [I]t follows that as a general rule notice and hearing should precede
removal of the student from school ... Students whose presence poses a
continuing danger to persons or property or an ongoing threat of dis-
rupting the academic process may be immediately removed from school
... the necessary notice and rudimentary hearing should follow as soon
as practicable...
Id. at 582, 583.
58. "Moreover, in those cases in which the Court has attempted to define due
process values, it has generally done so in an ambiguous and unsatisfactory fa-
sion,. .. especially in recent years [there has been a lack of I . .. symmetry, con-
tinuity, and principled content." Due Process Values, supra note 27, at 113. See
also Predeprivation Hearing, supra note 28, at 1201 nn.2 & 3.
59. Mashaw, Calculus for Administrative Adjudication, 44 U. CHI. L. REv. 28,
36, 37 (1976).
60. 424 U.S. 319 (1976).
61. Predeprivation Hearing, supra note 28, at 1218. But see Board of Curators
v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78, 99-100 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring in part, dissenting
in part). Mr. Justice Marshall views Eldridge as a summary of prior procedural
due process decisions.
hearing was necessitated, based on the weight of "three distinct
factors." Mr. Justice Powell, who wrote for the majority, cited
these factors as:
[FJirst, the private interest that will be affected by the official action; sec-
ond, the risk of erroneous deprivation of such interest through the proce-
dures used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute
procedural safeguards; and finally, the government's interest, including
the function involved and the fiscal and administrative burdens that the
additional or substitute procedural requirement would entail.6
2
Noticeably absent in the Eldridge decision was any mention of
the prior hearing rule or its emergency exception.
The Eldridge case was concerned with the procedures involved
in the termination of disability insurance benefits. However, the
Court quickly demonstrated in Dixon v. Love 63 that the Eldridge
balancing test could also be utilized in the context of summary
revocations of drivers' licenses.
In Love, the Court upheld an Illinois statute which authorized
the Secretary of State of Illinois to summarily suspend or revoke
a driver's license if the driver accumulated three traffic convic-
tions within a twelve month period.64 The Court utilized the El-
dridge test and determined, despite the Bell v. Burson directive
to the contrary, 65 that summary revocation of a driver's license
did not necessarily involve a denial of procedural due process.
The Love majority initially noted that there were two aspects of
a driver's license which must be considered in assessing the
"weight" 66 of the private interest. The first was the inability of
the driver to be "made entirely whole if his suspension or revoca-
62. 424 U.S. at 335.
63. 431 U.S. 105 (1977).
64. The statute involved in Love provided in part:
A person who has been convicted of three (3) or more offenses against
traffic regulations... occurr[ing] within a twelve (12) month period may
be suspended as follows:
Number of Points Action
20 to 44 Suspension up to 2 months
45 to 74 Suspension up to 3 months
75 to 89 Suspension up to 6 months
90 to 99 Suspension up to 9 months
100 to 109 Suspension up to 12 months
Over 110 Revocation for not less than 12 months
431 U.S. at 108 n.4. Compare this statute and its 12 month suspension with MASS.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24(1) (f) (West Supp. 1976) and its three month suspen-
sion period. See note 9 supra.
65. See note 15 supra.
66. The term "weight" in the context of the Eldridge test appears to signify
the importance of the interest at stake. Naturally, in a weighing process, the ob-
jects weighed must have some weight. See Mackey v. Montrym, 99 S. Ct. at 2617,
2618. The search for the weight of the interest follows the determination of the
"nature" of the interest (whether it is worthy of constitutional protection). See
note 33 supra.
[Vol. 7: 737, 19801 Mackey v. Montryn
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tion [was] later vacated. '67 A comparison to the private interest
in Eldridge, where a disability payment recipient could be "made
whole" (by receiving back payments due to him) illustrated this
point. The second aspect discussed was that one's private inter-
est in a driver's license was not as significant as was a private in-
terest that provided a means of subsistence.68 A comparison to
the private interest in Goldberg (a pre-Eldridge case), where so-
cial insurance payments were the means of subsistence, illus-
trated this point. The majority seemed to include a third
consideration, the presence of a "special hardship provision"
which could be used to stay a suspension or revocation for com-
mercial drivers who had to drive to earn a living, in the private
interest analysis.69 Thus, it appeared that three aspects of a
driver's license, the "making whole" retroactive compensation,
the subsistence needs fulfilled by the private interest, and the
special hardship provision, figured in the Love Court's determina-
tion that the "weight" of a private interest in a driver's license
was "not . .. great."70
The risk of erroneous deprivation of the driver's license in Love
was similarly deemed "not great" because the procedures in-
volved were "largely automatic," or in other words, non-discre-
tionary.7 1 Also considered was the fact that the initiating force of
the suspension was three traffic convictions. Since the driver
"had the opportunity for a full judicial hearing in connection with
each of the traffic convictions on which the secretary's decision
was based, ' 72 the risk of an erroneous initial factual determina-
tion was held as minimal. Furthermore, the Court held that an al-
67. 431 U.S. at 113. Later discussion of "retroactive compensation" specifically
alludes to this "making whole" consideration.
68. Id.
69. Since the Love Court made no explanatory demarcation between the dis-
cussion of the special hardship provision and the other two criteria used in assess-
ment of the private interest, the use of the hardship provision in such assessment
would seem in order.
70. The use of the conclusionary terms "not great," "substantial," "great," "in-
substantial" merely reflects the particular Eldridge factor's position among the
other Eldridge factors. The Court has yet to devise a qualitative assignment of
each factor's importance in a case. Therefore, since the label given the particular
Eldridge factor is relative, a survey of all the factors is necessary to discern the
most important interest in the case.
71. 431 U.S. at 113.
72. Id. at 113, 114. In this case the driver was not contesting the convictions or
the factual basis for the suspension. He was, in the view of the majority, only ask-
ing for a presuspension hearing so he could plead for leniency.
ternative procedure (a prior hearing), even though it might make
the driver "feel that he had received more attention," 73 would
nonetheless be useless "in reducing the number of erroneous
deprivations." 74
Finally, the government interest in Love was given "great
weight" 75 based on two considerations. The first was simply "ad-
ministrative efficiency. '76 The second, and "[fJar more substan-
tial" interest was in "safety on the roads and highways" by
"prompt removal of a safety hazard."77
Accordingly, under the Love decision and Eldridge analysis,
the legal community was informed that summary driver's license
suspension or revocation procedures aimed at highway safety
could withstand a procedural due process challenge.
In 1977, in Montrym v. Panora,78 a three judge district court79
held that a hearing was required prior to the suspension of a
driver's license under an automobile implied consent statute.80 In
this case the majority placed great weight upon the fact that the
Massachusetts statutory scheme, as compared to the Illinois stat-
ute in Love, did not have a special provision for hardship cases.8 1
The district court majority believed that the presence of such a
provision was crucial in the Supreme Court's determination that
the driver's private interest in Love was minimal.82 Accordingly,
the district court held that the absence of such a provision ren-
dered Montrym's private interest greater weight than that at
stake in Love.
73. Id. at 114. The majority asserts that such an effect would have no value in
this area. However, such an effect might have value in other considerations of pro-
cedural due process analysis. Cf., Notice and Right to be Heard, supra note 30, at
453, 454 (This article asserts that recognition of a person's dignity is inherent in a
hearing, when one is offered. Such recognition of dignity promotes legitimacy in
the action taken and the hearing makes the individual feel "that justice has been
done." But when there is no hearing, such recognition cannot be made and the
feeling that an injustice has been done prevails).
74. 431 U.S. at 114.
75. Since the other two factors, under Eldridge analysis were held as "not
great," the government interest prevails as the most important interest at stake in
Love. See note 70 supra.
76. 431 U.S. at 114.
77. The Love Court points out that this "factor" fully distinguishes this case
from the ruling in Bell v. Burson, 402 U.S. at 540, where the purpose of that statute
was to make sure there was a source from which judgments from accident suits
could be paid. Id. at 114, 115. See note 15 supra.
78. 438 F. Supp. 1157 (D. Mass. 1977). See note 2 supra.
79. In a two to one majority.
80. See note 3 supra.
81. See note 69 supra. But the Panora court took the analysis of the special
hardship provision one step further by noting that the Love Court held the pres-
ence of such a provision "a controlling factor" in the Love decision. 438 F. Supp. at
1159.
82. 438 F. Supp. at 1159.
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The Panora court, in its analysis of the risk of erroneous depri-
vation, held there was less risk in the Illinois procedure of Love
than there was in the Massachusetts procedure. The lack of judi-
cial hearings and convictions as conditions precedent for the sus-
pension,8 3 and that the factual basis used to initiate the
suspension 84 were not "objectively ascertainable," were cited as
the reasons why the risk of error in Panora was greater than the
risk in Love.
Finally, the district court, in its analysis of the government in-
terest, held that the Massachusetts implied consent statute would
be amenable to a prior hearing provision.85 Basically stated, the
rationale for this conclusion was that since there was a "gap" be-
tween the time of the arrest of a drunk driver and the time of his
conviction (when he was removed from the highways), this "gap"
might as well be filled by the safeguard of a presuspension hear-
ing for one who refused to take the breathalyzer test. In this re-
gard, the Panora court held a prior hearing would not delay, and
hence "offend" the state interest in safe highways.86
At this juncture it appeared that Panora was an inroad on the
Love decision. As long as a summary driver's license suspension
or revocation procedure, under Eldridge analysis, (1) did not
have a special hardship provision, (2) did not have either a judi-
cial hearing or objectively ascertainable facts which initiated the
summary procedure, and (3) had an amenability for a prior hear-
ing, then Panora indicated such a procedure would be unconstitu-
tional. A bare Supreme Court majority took the opportunity to
show the Panora court how wrong their analysis of Love was in
the case of Mackey v. Montrym.87
83. Id. at 1160.
84. There were three factual bases used to initiate the suspension in which
the Panora court, and later in which the Mackey majority recognized: (1) an ar-
rest for drunk driving; (2) probable cause that the motorist was intoxicated while
driving; and (3) a refusal to take the breathalyzer test. Id. at 1160 n.3. A reading
of the Massachusetts law confirms this recognition. See notes 8 and 13 supra. The
Panora court suggests, however, that the subsequent request by Montrym to take
the test nullified the refusal and in this regard the factual bases were not, as the
Love decision demanded, "objectively ascertainable." 438 F. Supp. at 1160, 1161.
85. 438 F. Supp. at 1161.
86. Id.
87. 99 S. Ct. 2612 (1979).
VI. THE MACKEY RATIONALE
The majority88 of the Court paid particular attention to the Mas-
sachusetts implied consent statute8 9 in deciding whether a prior
hearing was constitutionally mandated. The growing popularity
of these statutes in other states indicates the intent of state legis-
lators to stem the tide of increasing numbers of traffic fatalities
attributable to drunk drivers. Judicial support for these types of
statutes is also evidenced by the fact that these statutes have gen-
erally withstood constitutional attacks on various grounds. 90
Thus, with a great deal of constitutional law supporting the stat-
ute, the Mackey Court applied the Eldridge test to a procedure
akin to that of Love. The Court held, as it did in Love, that the
summary nature of the procedure did not violate procedural due
process dictates of the fourteenth amendment.
The Court, after considering a few prefatory matters,91 went
into a detailed comparison of the Eldridge balancing factors be-
tween the Love decision and the Panora decision. Organizational
clarity demands that each factor be given separate consideration.
A. The Private Interest
Although some critics assail this interest as the low priority in
Eldridge analysis, 92 the Mackey Court went into a detailed analy-
sis of Montrym's private interest. The Court first noted, based on
Bell and Love that the "nature" of a driver's license was that of a
constitutionally protected property interest. Then the Court
sought determination of the "weight" of Montrym's private inter-
est. Such a determination was based on two factors. The first
88. See note 3 supra.
89. Id.
90. See generally 2 ERWIN, DEFENSE OF DRUNK DRIVING CASES 33-5 to 33-13
(1979). This text cites numerous constitutional attacks on implied consent laws in-
cluding the right against self-incrimination, substantive due process, procedural
due process, bill of attainder, ex post facto laws, equal protection, invasion of right
of privacy, and that the law constituted an impermissible burden upon interstate
commerce, which have all failed [hereinafter cited as ERWIN].
91. The Court noted, based on Bell and Love, that the motorist's interest in
his driver's license is a constitutionally protected property interest. 99 S. Ct. at
2617. See note 33 supra.
92. See TRIBE, CONsTrrIyrONAL LAW 541-42 (1978) (The author submits that the
advent of the Eldridge test has caused a break in tradition in which the private
interest appears to be losing its once favored status in procedural due process ju-
risprudence). See also Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 773, 776-77 (1964)
(noting that there is a "fundamental fallacy" in thinking that courts treat the indi-
vidual interest as affecting only the party to the case. In fact, the courts are
acutely aware of the public interest (or harm) involved in every decision. So even
though the public interest is no justification for the erosion of freedom, the usual
result, where the individual interest is balanced against the public interest, is that
the latter almost always prevails).
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was the "making whole" possibility of retroactive compensation
which, as in Love, was deemed non-existent concerning the depri-
vation of a driver's license. 93 The Court's assessment of this fac-
tor followed the rationale of Love and similarly held that the
preclusion of retroactive compensation rendered Montrym's inter-
est "substantial" in nature. 94
The second factor considered by the majority was the length of
the deprivation of the driver's license prior to the hearing. In
their assessment of this factor, the majority held that Montrym's
interest was "less substantial" than the driver's in Love because
Montrym could get a "walk-in" immediate hearing.95 The driver
in Love had to wait at least twenty days for his hearing.96
The Mackey majority concluded its analysis of Montrym's inter-
est by specifically addressing the Panora court's consideration of
the special hardship provision as a controlling factor in the Love
decision.97 Mr. Chief Justice Burger made it quite clear that the
presence or absence of a "special hardship provision" was "in no
sense a controlling factor"98 in the determination of the "weight"
of a driver's private interest. The Chief Justice stated that the im-
portance the Panora court attached to the hardship provision was
unfounded because the motorist who wanted to use this provision
could only do so after the deprivation of the driver's license. 99
Thus, such a provision could not halt a deprivation prior to the
hearing, but rather, only make it a shorter deprivation.100
Accordingly, since the absence of the special hardship provision
93. 99 S. Ct. at 2617, 2618. See note 67 supra, and accompanying text.
94. See note 70 supra.
95. 99 S. Ct. at 2618. Contra, 99 S. Ct. 2626 (The dissent notes that in practice
the hearing is not immediate). See notes 147 and 148 and accompanying text, in-
fra.
96. 431 U.S. at 109, 110. Query whether the majority's preoccupation with the
"immediate hearing" was necessary. Inasmuch as a twenty day period before the
hearing was constitutionally permitted in Love, it may be argued that a shorter
waiting period would not be unconstitutional.
97. See notes 69 and 81 supra.
98. 99 S. Ct. at 2618.
99. This aspect of the hardship provision was readily ascertainable to the Pa-
nora majority had they considered the Love Court's statement "that these [the
hardship provision]. statutory provisions contemplate relief only after the initial
decision to suspend or revoke is made ... " Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 114 n.10
(1977). See id. at 109 n.7.
100. Taken in regard of the Court's position that a wrong cannot be done even
if it can be later undone, Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 647 (1972), the "dismissal"
of the hardship provision is understandable. Since the hardship provision only be-
came operative after the initial fact determination and the deprivation, its equiva-
lence with a prior hearing was unfounded.
was of no consequence in the assessment of the weight of a mo-
torist's private interest, Montrym's interest could not be given any
greater weight than the driver's interest in Love. This conclusion
portends the end result of Love where the government interest
was ultimately accorded the greatest weight.' 0 '
B. The Risk of Erroneous Deprivation
The Court initiated its analysis of the risk of erroneous depriva-
tion by cautioning that procedural due process is aimed at mini-
mizing, not eradicating the risk of error 0 2 and that something
less than an evidentiary hearing is sufficient prior to adverse ad-
ministrative action.I0 3 After this pronouncement, the majority in-
dicated it would examine the pre-deprivation procedures, which
were far less protective than would be a prior evidentiary or non-
evidentiary hearing, to ascertain if those procedures were "a rea-
sonably reliable basis for concluding that the facts justifying the
official action are as a responsible government official warrants
them to be."104
The first point of analysis was directed at the three facts
needed to initiate the ninety day suspension: probable cause, an
arrest for drunk driving, and a refusal to take a breathalyzer
test. 0 -5
Even though these facts did not pass under judicial scrutiny as
did the suspension-initiating convictions in Love, the Court held
that these three facts were objective in nature 0 6 and easily ascer-
tainable to a police officer who was "trained" in observation of
these facts.1 0 7
101. The majority opinion was rather obvious in this regard. "Neither the na-
ture nor the weight of the private interest involved in this case compels a result
contrary to that reached in Love." 99 S. Ct. at 2618.
102. The function of legal process ... is to minimize the risk of erroneous
deprivation. Because of the broad spectrum of concerns to which the term
must apply, flexibility is necessary to gear the process to the particular
need, the quantum and the quality of the process due in a particular situa-
tion depends upon the need to serve the purpose of minimizing the risk of
error (emphasis added).
Greenholtz v. Nebraska Penal Inmates, 99 S. Ct. 2100, 2106 (1979).
103. 99 S. Ct. at 2618. Love states the same proposition at the conclusion of the
private interest analysis. 431 U.S. at 113.
104. 99 S. Ct. at 2619.
105. See notes 8, 13, and 84 supra.
106. The "objectivity" discussed by the Court means that the presence or ab-
sence of the suspension initiating facts is indisputable; either the motorist refused
to take the test when so requested or he did not. Cf, the Panora view on this mat-
ter. See note 84 supra (where the District Court held that the fact of refusal was
not so objectively ascertainable). See 438 F. Supp. at 1160, 1161).
107. Since a policeman is usually trained in drunk driving detection, his obser-
vations and accumulated experience make him "well suited for the role the statute
accords him . . ." 99 S. Ct. at 2619. The Court's analysis of the "initial fact" re-
[Vol. 7: 737, 1980] Mackey v. Montryn
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
A purported issue of the police officer's failure to notify Mon-
trym of the consequences of a failure to take the breathalyzer was
dismissed from the majority's consideration altogether.108 The
consideration of whether a breathalyzer test could be given after
a refusal was similarly dismissed. The majority found that a situ-
ation involving a request to take the test after a refusal was a
question of law, and not one of the "objective facts" needed to ini-
tiate the suspension'0 9 as Panora and the dissent suggested.
Accordingly, the Mackey Court corrected the Panora interpre-
tation of Love's requirement of "something less than a prior evi-
dentiary hearing."n1 0 However, the correction to the requirement
of a prior judicial hearing, carried the implication that objective
criteria, which formed the basis for the license suspension, would
obviate the need for any prior hearing whatsoever."' In this re-
gard, Mackey limited the scope of Love's analysis of the risk of
erroneous deprivation by focusing on the objectivity of the initiat-
ing facts and not the processes used (hearings) to arrive at those
facts. Under this analysis the majority concluded that the risk of
erroneous deprivation in the Massachusetts statutory scheme
was, as in Love, minimal.
1. Alternative Procedures Inquiry
Montrym vigorously argued that a clerical error would eradicate
any precautionary measure in the summary procedure. In re-
sponse to this argument, the majority compared the practical use-
ported in Mackey is consistent with other Supreme Court decisions. See, e.g.,
Barry v. Barchi, 99 S. Ct. 2642, 2649 (1979); Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 343
(1976).
108. The majority defers to the police officers on this issue. The officer's affida-
vit, which was sworn under oath and carried criminal and civil sanctions for false
or erroneous statements, MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24(1)(f) (West Supp.
1976), asserted that Montrym was given the required prior warning. 99 S. Ct. at
2614 n.1, 2619. But see note 135 infra, and accompanying text.
109. Indeed, the statute says nothing about a request to take the breathalyzer
test after a refusal. But the tenor of the statute lends itself to an interpretation
that the first response to the request, be it willingness or refusal to take the test, is
determinative. See note 7 supra.
110. See note 103 supra. By showing that the facts used to initiate the suspen-
sion did not .have to be judicially scrutinized in order to be "objective."
111. In the entire sequence, from arrest until suspension, the only allusion to a
"hearing" of any form was the motorist's informal chat with the arresting officer.
99 S. Ct. 2619. In this regard there is something significantly less than the prior
evidentiary hearing suggested in Love. See note 103 supra. See also Goss v. Lo-
pez, 419 U.S. 565 (1975) (where the Court promotes the same sort of rudimentary
prior hearing).
fulness of a prior non-evidentiary hearing against the functions
and duties allocated by the statute which would confront a cleri-
cal error situation.
The majority called attention to the nature of the Registrar's
province in the statutory scheme. It was initially noted that if the
clerical error was "material"112 the Registrar would detect it in his
determination of whether the report or affidavit complied with the
law.13
Secondly, the non-discretionary nature of the Registrar's sus-
pension power was considered. If the report fulifiled the statutory
criteria,114 the Registrar could not stay the suspension.115 Con-
versely, if the report, due to material clerical error, did not comply
with the statute, the Registrar could not suspend the license."16
Therefore, under these circumstances a prior hearing would not
serve a worthwhile purpose inasmuch as the report was either
sufficient or insufficient to initiate the suspension. Thus, the ma-
jority felt that such sufficiency in the Massachusetts procedure
could be ascertained by the Registrar alone." 7 Therefore, as in
Love, a prior hearing was not deemed an advisable or necessary
alternative.
C. The Government Interest
The Mackey Court's treatment of the Massachusetts interest
followed the deferential line of analysis employed by the Court in
112. Meaning "if the [police] report does not comply with the [three] require-
ments .. " MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 90, § 24(1) (g) (West Supp. 1976).
113. "[Ilf errors are genuine and material they already will have been noted by
the Registrar in the ordinary course of his review of the report" (emphasis ad-
ded). 99 S. Ct. at 2620. Note that the Court places reliance on the "ordinary case"
that comes before the Registrar, "this independent review by a detached public of-
ficer should suffice in the ordinary case. . . ." (emphasis added). 99 S. Ct. at 2620.
The Mackey case does not appear to be the ordinary case contemplated by the
Massachusetts legislature. However, the Court might easily evade the argument
that the Mackey case was extraordinary and that the Registrar was ill-equipped to
review the report alone. Reference to Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 344, shows
the futility of the aforementioned argument: "procedural due process rules are
shaped by the risk of error inherent in the truthfinding process as applied to the
generality of cases, not the rare exceptions" (emphasis added).
114. See notes 8, 13 and 84 supra.
115. The Registrar has no such discretion without a lower court order acquit-
ting the motorist of the drunk driving charge. Compare MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch.
90, § 24(1) (f) (West Supp. 1976) and note 9 supra, with MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch.
90, § 24(2)(c) (West Supp. 1976) and note 11 supra.
116. Id.
117. 99 S. Ct. at 2620. The Court also noted that a nonevidentiary prior hearing
would be useless because the Registrar would have to hear a case with no record
of the facts at his disposal. Thus, the character of such a hearing would be akin to
a swearing contest with no proof to show the Registrar who was asserting the
truth.
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Love." 8 The simple fact that the Massachusetts statute had the
same interest as did the Illinois statute in Love, namely safety on
the roads, explains the Court's apparent predisposition to give
this interest paramount weight in the Eldridge balance. Since the
Love "safety on the roads" interest was held to be the most
weighty from among the Eldridge factors, the same interest
should, again, be accorded the greatest weight in Mackey.119
1. Alternative Procedures Inquiry
The Mackey Court went a step further in their analysis of the
government interest than did the Love Court. In Mackey, the ma-
jority isolated three goals served by the summary nature of the
implied consent statute. The first was that the summary suspen-
sion served as a "deterrent to drunk driving."120 The second and
main goal, as applied in Mackey, was that suspension served as
an inducement'21 to take the breathalyzer test so the state would
have "reliable and relevant evidence for use in subsequent pro-
ceedings.' 22 The third, and least plausible goal, was that the
summary suspension promptly removed drunk drivers from the
road.123 Despite the tenuous relationship of the "deterrence" and
118. The Court's deference towards the government interests in Love and
Mackey is evidenced by the acceptance of the goals of the state statutes without
the same critical analysis utilized in the personal interest and risk of erroneous
deprivation assessments. This deference is traceable even to the roots of the El-
dridge test where the Court stated "substantial weight must be given to the good
faith judgment of the individuals charged by Congress with the administration of
the social welfare system." Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 349 (1976). See
TRIBE, CONSTrUTIONAL LAW 542 (1978).
119. 99 S. Ct. at 2621.
120. The Court stated that the summary nature of the statute served as a "de-
terrent." 99 S. Ct. at 2621. Query whether the three month suspension was the
real deterrent.
121. The dissent views the statute as coercion. 99 S. Ct. at 2625.
122. The evidentiary purpose of the statute is the reason for its acceptance in
this case. The Mackey Court clearly states "A state plainly has the right to offer
incentives for taking a test that provides the most reliable form of evidence of in-
toxication for use in subsequent proceedings (emphasis added)." 99 S. Ct. at 2621.
See also Hunvald and Zimring, Whatever Happened to Implied Consent? A Sound-
ing, 33 Mo. L. REV. 323, 367 (1968),
One of the major purposes of the implied consent law is to compel per-
sons arrested for drunk driving to submit to the [here a blood test] test,
and thus provide convincing evidence of their intoxication. With this evi-
dence, convictions are supposed to be more certain in those cases where
the test indicates intoxication.
See note 10 supra.
123. As stated by the dissefit, the statute really did not promptly remove drunk
"prompt removal" goals to the government interest in Mackey,124
the Court held the summary nature of the statute was "critical" to
the attainment of the three goals. The Court stated that the impo-
sition of an alternative procedure, namely a prior hearing, would
substantially undermine the state interest in public safety on the
roads. The rationale for this conclusion was that a presuspension
hearing would serve as an incentive not to take the breathalyzer,
as a dilatory tactic, and that it would pose a "substantial fiscal
and administrative burden on the [state]."125 Accordingly, the
government interest in Mackey was held not amenable to an al-
ternative prior hearing.
Furthermore, in a direct reply to the Panora decision, Mackey
states that it does not matter that safety on the roads could be
"served as well in other ways."'1 26 Realistically, a state, acting
under its police powers, does not have to cure all "evils" posed by
the drunk driver.127 Thus, the existence of the anomalous fact
that the drunk driver who takes the test stays on the road while a
sober driver who refuses to take the test is removed, was of no
consequence to the weight of the statute or its amenability to a
prior hearing. 28
Accordingly, Mackey held, as was previously held in Love, that
the "safety on the roads" government interest still outweighed the
private interest in a driver's license and the risk of erroneous dep-
rivation in a nondiscretionary summary revocation or suspension
procedure. This being the case, a prior hearing was not constitu-
tionally required and the Massachusetts implied consent statute
was valid. Thus, with the analysis of Love "corrected" by Mack-
ey, the Panora decision was reversed and remanded.
drivers from the road because a wholly inebriated motorist who took the test
would not lose his license until after a conviction. 99 S. Ct. at 2625.
124. Cf. Dixon v. Love, 431 U.S. 105, 114-15 (1977) (the notations of "deterrence"
and "prompt removal" goals, though having a tenuous relationship to the purpose
of the statute in Mackey, have a very close relationship to the reckless driver stat-
ute in Love. In this regard, the three goals of the Mackey case may be a broad
pronouncement of road safety law rationales. Accordingly, the fact that one ra-
tionale bears a close relationship would be enough to sustain the validity of the
road safety law).
125. The majority did not state any supporting facts or figures to reach this con-
clusion. See note 118 supra. Since the apparent reason for the Massachusett's
law's validity was evidentiary, the Court could have pointed to the need for evi-
dence in drunk driving cases as a casualty of a prior hearing requirement. An ex-
ample was available in the very facts of this case, namely, the lower state court
dismissal of the drunk driving charge against Montrym because no breathalyzer
test was given. 99 S. Ct. at 2615. See note 10 supra.
126. 99 S. Ct. at 2621.
127. Id.
128. Id.
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VII. THE DISSENT
If the majority's opinion in Mackey can be analogized as judi-
cial housekeeping, the dissenting justices 2 9 have noticed and
tripped over a few inconsistencies which have been proverbially
"swept under the rug" by the housekeeper. The dissent attacked
five points of the majority's opinion while concurrently stating
their agreement with the Panora decision.
The first line of attack was a reiteration of the prior hearing rule
and the emergency exception arguments of pre-Eldridge cases.
The dissent noted that since there was no prior hearing and,
based on Bell,130 no emergency situation present, the Massachu-
setts procedure was unconstitutional.131 The justices did not con-
sider the Love decision dispositive of such a conclusion.132
The second point the dissent raised was that facts used to initi-
ate the suspension were not objective. However, in arriving at
this conclusion, the dissent substituted one fact in place of an-
other which was considered both by Panora and the majority.
Previously, the three suspension initiating facts were noted as:
probable cause for an arrest, the arrest for drunk driving, and a
refusal to take the breathalyzer test.133 The dissent recognized
the probable cause and refusal criteria, but added that a "proper
request by the officer that the driver submit to a breathalyzer
test" (emphasis added), must be made.' 34 The "proper request"
in this case was, in the dissent's view, notice to Montrym that a
refusal to take the breathalyzer would precipitate a ninety day
suspension of his license. Since there was a discrepency whether
the officers did give Montrym proper notice,135 this evidenced a
129. Associate Justices Stewart, Brennan, Marshall, and Stevens.
130. The dissent held Bell as the controlling case on all driver's license suspen-
sions or revocations. They did not consider the distinguishing goals of the statutes.
involved in Bell, Love, and Mackey. See note 77 supra, and accompanying text.
131. The dissent's analysis in this argument refers consistently to the pre-El-
dridge cases and the prior hearing rule and emergency exception. Mr. Justice
Marshall's view in Horowitz that Eldridge represented a "summary" of prior pro-
cedural due process cases might explain this mode of analysis. See note 61 supra.
132. The discussion of Love in this argument centered on the fact that the mo-
torist had not contested the factual basis for his license revocation, 99 S. Ct. at
2623. See note 72 supra. This raises the question of why the Panora court insisted
that the request after the refusal nullified the initial refusal when Montrym did
not deny that he refused the test. 99 S. Ct. at 2614 n.1. See note 84 supra.
133. See note 8, 13, and 84 supra.
134. 99 S. Ct. at 2623.
135. 99 S. Ct. at 2614 n.1, 2619. See also 99 S. Ct. at 2617 n.6 (the Court did not
need for a presuspension hearing. However, this analysis was
rather tenuous inasmuch as the Massachusetts statute required
the reporting of probable cause, arrest for drunk driving, and re-
fusal to take the test in the report submitted to the registrar.136
Furthermore, the question about "proper requests" had been pre-
viously resolved in favor of the police officers having given such
notice.137
The third ground of attack, which was related to the aforemen-
tioned issue of proper notice, was that the credibility given to the
officer reporting the operative facts was too great. The dissent
suggests that the initial deprivation138 in this case was not
prompted by the same "exigencies of law enforcement" which, in
other cases, permitted such initial deprivation139 But the dissent
seemed to forget that courts have traditionally deferred to a po-
lice officer's initial perception of the facts of a case until the time
of a hearing.40 In this regard, the credibility given to the officer
was only as much as he or she traditionally possessed. Further-
more, the dissent did not even consider the fact that the officers
would be subject to civil and criminal sanctions for a misleading
or erroneous report. In sum, this credibility argument did little to
really have to address this notice argument because it was not framed in the
pleadings nor decided by the District Court).
136. See note 13 supra. A question prevails based on an assumption that the
notice argument was properly in front of the Court in Mackey. Specifically, since
the fact of notice is not one of the contestable facts presentable to the Registrar
under the Massachusetts law, what recourse would the motorist have? MASS. GEN.
LAws ANN. ch. 90, § 28 (West Supp. 1976) provides that the suspended motorist, af-
ter a hearing and adverse ruling by the Registrar, may appeal that ruling to a
Board of Appeal, which may, after a hearing, affirm or rescind the suspension. But
the suspension stays in effect until overturned by the Board. Thus the motorist is
still without his license. After the Board's decision, if adverse, the motorist could
seek judicial review of that decision. MASS. GEN. LAws ANN. ch. 30A, § 14 (West
Supp. 1976). Had Montrym framed this issue in the pleadings, he would have
stood on very good ground to show that his effective hearing would have taken
greater than the twenty days as permitted in Love. See note 96 supra.
137. 99 S. Ct. 2614 n.1. See note 135 supra.
138. The suspension before a hearing was convened.
139. This point is debatable. Since the goal of the statute in this case was to
obtain evidence (that was dissipating through passage of time), it can be com-
pared to the exigencies of law enforcement in preserving such evidence. See
Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752 (1969).
140. Although the Fourth Amendment specifically proscribes "seizure" of a
person without probable cause, the risk that police will act unreasonably
in arresting a suspect is not thought to require an advance determination
of the facts ... Despite the distinct possibility that the police officer may
improperly assess the facts and thus unconstitutionally deprive an indi-
vidual of liberty, we declined to depart from the traditional rule by which
the officer's perception is subjected to judicial scrutiny only after the fact
(emphasis added).
Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 679-80 (1977).
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subtract from the majority's conclusion that the risk of erroneous
deprivation was minimal.
The fourth ground of attack centered on the tenuous relation-
ship between the summary procedure and the desire to promptly
remove drunk drivers from the road.14 1 The dissent, as well as
the Panora majority, pointed out that a drunk driver who took the
breathalyzer would not get a ninety day suspension. 42 Thus, the
purported target of the implied consent law, the drunk driver, was
not removed from the road until convicted. If the "prompt re-
moval" goal was the sole reason for the existence of the statute,
the dissent would be on solid ground in their criticism. However,
the majority clearly stated that the need for convincing evidence
was the main goal of the statute. 43 In this regard, the dissent's
criticism, although valid on the "prompt removal" rationale, is off-
center of the real purpose of the Massachusetts statute.
Finally, the fifth and most plausible ground of attack employed
by the dissent was that, despite the majority's claims to the con-
trary, the "walk-in" hearing was, in reality, not immediate. 44
Since it took time to marshal witnesses and prepare an argument
for the hearing, the dissent observed that the "walk-in procedure
provide [d] little more than a right to request the scheduling of a
later hearing."145 This fact, coupled with the infirmities of a "lame
duck" Registrar who had no discretion to stay a suspension, effec-
tively operated to preclude the motorist from any "prompt post-
suspension relief."' 4 6 Thus, the dissent believed a prior hearing
was constitutionally mandated.
The defect of this criticism lies in the oversight of the realities
of a hearing. Rarely is a hearing held immediately after the depri-
vation of an interest. Even if this were the case, it would do the
141. 99 S. Ct. at 2625.
142. Id. However, once the driver is convicted of drunk driving, he "shall be
punished by a fine of not less than thirty-five nor more than one thousand dollars,
or by imprisonment for not less than two weeks nor more than two years, or both
such fine and imprisonment." MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 90, § 24(1) (a) (West
Supp. 1976). Thus, in the long run, the drunk who takes the test and walks out
that day will suffer greater loss than would the recipient of the ninety day suspen-
sion. It passes without mention that the convicted motorist has a longer than
ninety day wait until he gets his license returned to him. See MASS. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 90, § 24(1)(c) (West Supp. 1976).
143. See note 122 supra.
144. 99 S. Ct. at 2626.
145. Id.
146. Id.
motorist little good to walk in and present an ad hoc argument to
the Registrar. If a literally "immediate" hearing was required this
might work as a disservice to the motorist because he would not
have time to prepare his argument or attend the hearing.147 In
this regard, the dissent's criticism of the lack of an "immediate"
hearing, while valid in theory, is not persuasive in practice.
Therefore, while making noteworthy criticism based on theoret-
ical application of broad procedural due process concepts, the dis-
sent has ignored the realities of law enforcement and drunk
driving and has overlooked the true evidentiary purpose of the
Massachusetts statute. A dismissal of the points raised by the
dissent would do a grave injustice. A five to four decision, similar
to Mackey, in no way indicates the infallibility of the majority
opinion. At least for the present, with the present majority of
Mackey intact,148 it appears that, under Eldridge analysis, the
Love decision will serve as a guide for the constitutional procedu-
ral safeguards necessary for the survival of a summary driver's li-
cense suspension or revocation procedure.
VIII. IMPACT OF MACKEY
There are several implications from the Mackey decision wor-
thy of recognition. The most obvious is that the Eldridge test is
reaffirmed as the proper mode of analysis for resolving procedural
due process issues. Equally obvious is that the Love decision is
applicable to a variety of road safety laws. But in the confirma-
tion of the Love decision, the Mackey Court has shown a deferen-
tial posture towards state legislative schemes aimed at promoting
road safety.14 9
Additionally, Mackey listed three broad rationales, which, if in
some manner150 serve to promote road safety, would legitimize
the summary revocation of a driver's license. Since these ratio-
nales: deterrence, inducement, and removal of dangerous drivers
147. If the motorist was required to appear before the Registrar immediately af-
ter suspension, such motorist would have little time to present whatever forceful
case he had. Furthermore, what about the motorist who has an unbreakable out of
town (or state) engagement? A required immediate hearing might well result in
no hearing at all. Since all that due process requires is that one has an "opportu-
nity to be heard," Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306 (1950), if the
motorist cannot appear immediately, then he cannot appear at all; despite the fact
that he was afforded the "opportunity."
148. See note 23 supra.
149. See notes 90 and 92 supra.
150. If the "deterrence" and "prompt removal" rationales can work in Mackey,
then they can work anywhere. The relationship between the statute and the goal
need not be logically "close" at all. See note 124 supra.
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from the road, "worked" (albeit tenuously) in Mackey, it appears
that they could be applied in any driver's license situation.
In a broader context, Mackey illustrates that the Eldridge bal-
ancing test has not provided such a clarifying impact on procedu-
ral due process analysis.151 When the Panora court made its
ruling, the decision of Dixon v. Love was already "on the books"
and held, under Eldridge analysis, that summary revocation of a
driver's license was constitutional on procedural due process
grounds. But the Panora court arrived at a conclusion, under El-
dridge analysis, which was contrary to the purported intention of
the Supreme Court. Consideration of the fact that Mackey was
decided by a closely divided Court evidences the conclusion that
the Eldridge test has not provided the curative remedy to incon-
sistent handling of procedural due process issues. Therefore, at
least for the present, Mackey tells the legal community that the
Supreme Court will keep a watchful eye on the use of the El-
dridge test while nurturing its viability in constitutional law anal-
ysis.
As for the proponents of implied consent statutes, Mackey pro-
vides one more ground of constitutional support for the implied
consent law. In this regard, it presently appears that a federal
constitutional attack on the implied consent law would bear little
fruit for such a costly effort. 152
IX. CONCLUSION
The invariable consequence of a positive development portends
the presence of a negative event. In Mackey the positive develop-
ment was a "correction" aimed at consistency in procedural due
process analysis. However, this was small consolation for the eco-
nomic hardship that faced Montrym. As stated in the briefs of
counsel, Montrym needed the license to drive his car which was
his means of employment. 53 One could speculate on a different
result in Mackey had this case been before the Court prior to the
151. The Court has been called on to standardize Eldridge analysis in other fac-
tual settings. See, e.g., Bd. of Curators v. Horowitz, 435 U.S. 78 (1978) (dismissal
from medical school compared with Goss suspension from secondary school);
Hortonville Joint School Dist. 1 v. Hortonville Educ. Ass'n, 426 U.S. 482 (1976) (dis-
missal from job compared with Morrisey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471 (1972)).
152. The procedural due process sanction of Mackey can thusly be added to the
long list of cases supporting such a law. See ERWIN note 90 supra.
153. Brief for Appellee at 9, 10, Mackey v. Montrym, 99 S. Ct. 2612 (1979).
Love decision. Unfortunately for Montrym, the Court majority
chose to confirm, not reconsider, the proposition that summary
revocation or suspension of a driver's license was constitutionally
permissible.
Critics have asserted that the Court, rather than seeking a pro-
cedural due process test which places a high priority on human
values, dignity or individualized circumstances, has sought just
the opposite.15 4 A superficial reading of the Mackey decision
would do little to dispel such criticism. However, reference to
footnote six in the majority opinion 5 5 indicates that individual-
ized consideration is not beyond the scope of the Court's analysis.
Mr. Chief Justice Burger stated that the Court was precluded
from discussing Mackey on an "as applied" basislS6 because the
Panora court never discussed it. In making such a statement, the
Chief Justice might be hinting that a narrowly drawn "as applied"
constitutional attack might have resulted in a ruling in favor of
Montrym. If this is the case, and the Supreme Court takes the op-
portunity to consider an "as applied" attack that evidences some
recognition of "individualized circumstances," the Eldridge test
could very well produce consistent rulings and gain acceptability
greater than that illustrated in Mackey v. Montrym.
ALAN J. COHEN
154. See generally Due Process Values, supra note 27, at 125; TRIME, CONSTrrU-
TIONAL LAw 542 (1978); Notice and the Right to be Heard, supra note 30, at 453.
155. Because the District Court held the statute unconstitutional on its face
and granted classwide relief, it never reached the "as applied" challenge
raised in Montrym's complaint; nor do we. The validity of that challenge
. ..must be determined by the District Court on remand..
99 S. Ct. at 2617 n.6. See also 99 S. Ct. at 2627 n.7.
156. Id.
